Key Agreement and Authentication Schemes Using Non-Commutative
  Semigroups by Chowdhury, M. M.
ar
X
iv
:0
70
8.
23
95
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
0 A
ug
 20
07
Key Agreement and Authentication Schemes
Using Non-Commutative Semigroups
M.M. Chowdhury
Abstract
We give a new two-pass authentication scheme, which is a generalisation of an
authentication scheme of Sibert-Dehornoy-Girault based on the Diffie-Hellman
conjugacy problem. Compared to the above scheme, for some parameters it
is more efficient with respect to multiplications. We sketch a proof that our
authentication scheme is secure.
1. Introduction
In recent years various cryptographic protocols using infinite non-abelian
groups have been proposed. For example the seminal algebraic key establish-
ment protocol given in [1], and Artin’s braid groups have been popular choices
for such protocols. Braid groups are a popular choice because they are not too
complicated to work with and they are more complicated than abelian groups.
In particular the conjugacy problem in braid groups is algorithmically difficult
and hence gives a one-way function.
We give a new authentication scheme (by using equations (2) and (3) below
which form a main part of this paper), which is a generalisation of the authen-
tication scheme I of SDG (Sibert-Dehornoy-Girault) given in [10]. We do not
claim that equations (2) and (3) are totally original; for example a simpler ver-
sion of equation (3) is used in the authentication scheme in [14]. In this paper
we refer to the authentication scheme I in [10] as the SDG scheme. Based on the
proof of the SDG scheme given in [10] we sketch a proof that our new authen-
tication scheme is a perfectly honest-verifier ZK interactive proof of knowledge
of the prover’s secret. Two other provably secure schemes which are scheme II
and scheme III are given [10] and they differ from our authentication scheme
because they are zero-knowledge in an theoretical infinite framework, and they
are iterated three pass schemes. Other differences are that scheme II is based
on different hard problems compared to our authentication scheme. We refer
to [10] for further details of these schemes. Two related authentication schemes
were proposed in [11] and it was shown in [12] one “authentication scheme” in
[11] is totally insecure and the other authentication scheme as shown in [12] can
be broken by solving a specialisation of the decomposition problem defined in
[4] (see below). An authentication scheme is given in [14] which has security
based on a generalisation of the discrete logarithm problem in non-abelian finite
groups. The main difference of our authentication scheme from the authentica-
tion scheme in [14] and the unbroken scheme in [11], [12] is that it is based on
our version of the Diffie-Hellman decomposition problem defined below.
2. Hard Problems in Non-Abelian Groups
We now define the following known hard problems. The notation [I, J ] = 1
(resp. [I, J ] 6= 1) means that the subsets I and J of a semigroup G commute
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(resp. do not commute). We may consider G = Bn (the braid group of index
n) in the following known problems, because the problems are then hard and
by hard we mean there is no known algorithm to solve the problem such that
a cryptographic protocol based on the problem would be insecure for practical
use. When G = Bn then WLOG the usual choices for A and B are the braid
subgroups LBn and UBn (defined in section 3) as these are the choices that are
used in [2] and [6] but the choices of A and B may be different. For our protocol
to be secure at the very least G should be non-commutative.
The DP (Decomposition Problem) [4] is defined as follows.
Public Information: G is a semigroup, A is a subset of G. x, y ∈ G with y = axb.
Secret information: a, b ∈ A.
Objective: find elements f, g ∈ A such that fxg = y.
The definition of the DP above generalises the definition of a less general ver-
sion of the DP given in [6], [3] and [5]. The less general version only differs
from the above definition of DP because G is a group and A is a subgroup. In
our notation in all of this paper we omit the binary operation ∗ when writing
products so for example f ∗ x ∗ g is understood to mean fxg. We require that
∗ is efficiently computable.
The CSP (Conjugacy Search Problem) [1], [3] is defined as follows.
Public Information: G is a group. x, y ∈ G with y = f−1xf .
Secret Information: f ∈ G.
Objective: find an element g ∈ G such that g−1xg = y.
The DH-DP (Diffie-Hellman Decomposition Problem) [6], [3] is defined as fol-
lows.
Public Information: G is a group. A,B are subgroups of G with [A,B] = 1.
x, ya, yb ∈ G with ya = axb, yb = cxd.
Secret Information: a, b ∈ A, c, d ∈ B.
Objective: find the element cyad(= aybb = acxbd).
The DH-CP (Diffie-Hellman Conjugacy Problem) is the specialisation of the
DH-DP [6] with a = b−1 and c = d−1.
We now re-define the DP and DH-DP above as used in our authentication
scheme. In the rest of this paper below the DP and DH-DP will mean their
re-definitions.
The re-definition of the DP is as follows.
Public Information: G is a semigroup. A, B are subsets of G. x, y ∈ G with
y = axb.
Secret Information: a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
Objective: find elements f ∈ A, g ∈ B such that fxg = y.
The re-definition of the DH-DP is as follows.
Public information: G is a semigroup. A,B,C,D are subsets of G. x, ya, yb ∈ G
with ya = axb, yb = cxd.
Secret Information: a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C, d ∈ D.
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Objective: find the element cyad (= aybb = acxbd). So if we can find f ∈ A,
g ∈ B such that fxg = ya or h ∈ C, i ∈ D such that hxi = yb then this is
sufficient to break our schemes which have security based upon the DH-DP.
A variant of the above re-definition of the DH-DP which we refer to as the
DH-DP’ on which the security of our variant protocols is based upon is as
follows.
Public information: G is a semigroup. A,B,C,D are subsets of G. x, ya, yb ∈ G
with ya = axb, yb = caxbd.
Secret Information: a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C, d ∈ D. (a, b have an inverse).
Objective: find the element a−1ybb
−1(= cxd, ya = axb). So if we can find f ∈ A,
g ∈ B h ∈ C, i ∈ D such that hxi = cxd or f−1ybg
−1 = cxd, fxg = ya then this
is sufficient to break our schemes which have security based upon the DH-DP’.
In all of this paper for our authentication scheme the DP, DH-DP and DH-
DP’ are considered with commutativity conditions such as (2) and (3) defined
below. We assume the DP, DH-DP and DH-DP’ are hard. The connection
between the DH-DP and the DP is similar to the one between the Diffie-Hellman
problem and the discrete logarithm problem. The DH-DP, DH-DP’ is obviously
reducible to the DP, but we assume that it is as hard for general G. Hence
checking that the DP is hard for x is supposed to ensure that the DH-DP also
is.
The security of the modified key exchange protocol on page 2 of [4] is based
on the DP with the additional condition that [A,B] = 1 and its security is also
based on the DH-DP.
3. The Sibert-Dehornoy-Girault Authentication Scheme
All the details of implementation in braid groups for the SDG authentication
scheme I are given in [10] so we do not reproduce them all here; we restrict to the
details we require. For n ≥ 2, Bn is defined to be the group with the presentation
with n− 1 generators (plus the identity e), denoted σi for i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1 and
the defining relationships
σiσj = σjσi |i− j| > 1
σiσjσi = σjσiσj |i− j| = 1
(1)
We refer the reader to any textbook about braids, for instance [13]; each element
of Bn has the geometrical interpretation by an n-strand braid in the usual sense.
This geometrical interpretation is that any n-strand braid diagram can be first
sliced into a concatenation of elementary diagrams with one crossing each and
then each elementary diagram can be used to give an encoding of the braid
diagram as a word in one of the letters σi or σ
−1
i . σi is used for the diagram
where the ith strand crosses under the (i + 1) st one, and σ−1i is used for the
diagram where the ith strand crosses over the (i+ 1)st one.
LBn and UBn are the two commuting subgroups of Bn generated by the
Artin generators σ1, ..., σ⌊n/2⌋−1 and σ⌊n/2⌋, ..., σn−1 [10]. The SDG authenti-
cation is as follows. Following [10] we require that the DH-CP and CSP are
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hard in G as the security of the authentication is based on these problems, let
G = Bn, A = LBn, B = UBn in the DH-CP and CSP. Let G
′
be a non-abelian
group, let w ∈ G
′
be a publicly known word which has a secret word as one of its
factors (an attacker may attempt to recover this secret word from w), let S be a
function which maps w to an equivalent word, S is called a scrambling function,
the security of the protocol is based on the difficulty of recovering the above
secret word from the word S(w) [10]. A choice for the scrambling function can
be a normal form for w [10]. All braids are expressed in rewritten form using
the scrambling function such that the DH-CP and CSP are hard.
• Phase 1. Key generation
i) Choose a public b ∈ Bn.
ii) A(lice) chooses a secret braid s ∈ LBn, her private key; she publishes
b
′
= sbs−1; the pair (b, b
′
) is the public key.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase
i) B(ob) chooses r ∈ UBn and sends the challenge t = rbr
−1 to A.
ii) A sends the response y = h(sts−1) to B, and B checks y = h(rb
′
r−1).
h is a fixed collision-free hash function from braids to sequences of 0’s and
1’s or, possibly, to braids, for which this choice for h, G must have an efficient
solution for the word problem for use in phase 2ii).
A proof that the above authentication scheme is a perfectly honest-verifier
ZK interactive proof of knowledge of s is given in [10]. There is a linear algebraic
algorithm to solve the DH-CP but the attack is not efficient enough to break
the public-key cryptosystem with the proposed parameters of [2] in real time [6].
The SDG scheme has a similar structure to the public-key cryptosystem in [2]
because both algorithms are based on the DH-CP. Hence the parameters of the
SDG scheme are based on considerations of the parameters of the above public-
key cryptosystem [10]. Hence parameters can be chosen for the SDG scheme so
that it cannot be broken in real time by using the attack on the DH-CP in [6].
4. New Authentication Scheme
The new authentication scheme is as follows. Let G be a (infinite or finite)
non-commutative semigroup. We define the scrambling function as in the SDG
scheme, for our scheme, but with the modification that it is defined over the
semigroup G instead of only a group. All elements in G in this section are
rewritten using the scrambling function and parameters are chosen such that
the DH-DP and DP are hard, as the security of our authentication scheme is
based on these problems.
• Phase 0. Initial setup
i) G is chosen and is publicly known. The users publicly agree on which
method first, second or third (described below) will be used to select the
subsets and publicly agree on which of the commutativity conditions (2)
or (3) will be used.
A first method to select the parameters is to select publicly known subsets
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LA, LB, RA, RB and Z of G are chosen for which either property a) below
is true or property b) below is true. Let z ∈ Z with z the publicly known
element which is the value of x in the definition of the DH-DP used in the
example of the DH-DP in our new authentication scheme.
Following [5] let g ∈ G for G a group, CG(g) is the centraliser of g,
we describe the modifications to the authentication scheme (and these
apply to the key agreement protocol described below) to give two further
methods to select the subgroups as follows. Publicly known subsets or
privately known LA, LB, RA, RB and Z of G are chosen for which either
property 2) below is true or property 3) below for the second and third
methods below.
Using the above first method the security of the protocol is based on the
DH-DP. We now give the two further methods to select the subsets which result
in two modifications to the protocol when the first method is used. The second
method to select the subgroups is A chooses (a1, a2) ∈ G×G and publishes the
subgroups as a set of generators of the centralisers LB, RB, LB ⊆ CG(a1), RB ⊆
CG(a2), LB = {α1, ..., αk} etc. B chooses (b1, b2) ∈ LB × RB, and hence can
compute x below etc. Following [5] there is no explicit indication of where
to select a1, b1 and/or a2, b2 from. Hence before attempting something like a
length based attack in this case the attacker has to compute the centraliser of
LB and/or RB.
So a third method (this method is given for the key agreement protocol in
[5] ) to select the subgroups is
A chooses LA = G, a1 ∈ G, and publishes LB ⊆ CG(a1), LB = {α1, ..., αk},
B chooses LB = G, b2 ∈ G, and publishes RA ⊆ CG(b2), RA = {β1, ..., βk},
Hence A chooses (a1, a2) ∈ G × CG(b2) and publishes the subgroup(s) as a
set of generators of the centralisers B chooses (b1, b2) ∈ CG(a1)×G, and hence
can compute x etc. Again there is no explicit indication of where to select a1
and/or b2 from. Hence before attempting a length based attack in this case the
attacker has to compute the centraliser of LB and/or RB .
The above three methods are examples of the following method, in general
if a user A or B selects an element ai or bi respectively as their secret element
(which multiplies the public element z at the left WLOG) key then the other
user selects an element of the CG(ai) or CG(bi) respectively as their secret key
for the corresponding secret commuting element to left multiply WLOG, and
in general an attacker has no explicit indication of where to select ai and/or bi
from. A potential disadvantage of using the above third method to select the
subgroups is one user chooses the other users subgroups and this may aid the
user who has selected the subgroup to find the others users secret key, and this
secret key may be of use in say another attack. Hence before attempting a length
based attack in this case the attacker has to compute the centraliser of CG(ai)
and/or CG(bi). Note if the subgroups are selected in this in the second or third
way (using centraliser computations) then its security is based on a variant of
the DP, DH-DP and the difficulty of computing centralisers, for example if the
third method above is used to select the subsets then following the attack given
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in [5] the security of the protocol to find A or B′s private key may be found as
follows
Attack on A’s Key. Find an element a′
1
which commutes with every element
of the subgroup LB and an element a
′
2
∈ RB such that z
′ = a′
1
za′
2
where a′
1
za′
2
above may be rewritten using a normal form. The pair (a′
1
, a′
2
) is equivalent to
the pair (a1, a2), because a
′
1
za′
2
= a1za2 this means an attacker can authenti-
cate as Alice. The attack applies to the key exchange protocol below with the
modification KA = a
′
1
za′
2
instead of z′ = a′
1
za′
2
this gives a equivalent secret
key for A used to get the common secret key.
Attack on B’s Key in the key exchange protocol in the section below. Find
an element b′
2
which commutes with every element of the subgroup RA and an
element b′
1
∈ LB such that KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
where a′
1
za′
2
above may be rewritten
using a normal form. The pair (b′
1
, b′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (b1, b2), because
b′
1
zb′
2
= b1zb2 this means an attacker can find the common secret key when this
set up is used as part of a key exchange algorithm as described below.
Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to recover Bob private key (the
attack for A is similar)
B1. Compute the centraliser of RA, RA ⊆ CG(b2).
B2. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< LB > ·z · CG(RA).
So for the protocol to be secure we want both the above problems to be
computationally hard, for the problem B2 to be hard it is required the centraliser
CG(LA) should be large enough to resist a brute force attack. The key exchange
protocol in section 5 has security based upon the above problem. The above
attack can be used to attack the authentication scheme or recover B’s secret
elements with the modification x = b′
1
z′b′
2
instead of KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
(x is used
instead of KB and z
′ is used instead of z etc.).
The attacks above are considered with commutativity condition for the DH-
DP such as (2) and (3) below. A similar attack is discussed when the second
method is used to choose the subsets. Hence the platform groupG should satisfy
the requirements given in the security analysis in section 6.
a) If z 6= e we require the following conditions
[LA, LB] = 1, [RA, RB] = 1,
[LB, Z] 6= 1, [LA, Z] 6= 1,
[RB, Z] 6= 1, [RA, Z] 6= 1,
[LA, RA] 6= 1, [LB, RB] 6= 1.
(2)
All the above conditions for z 6= e can arise by generalising from properties of
subgroups used in either the SDG scheme or CKLHC scheme for example the
second and third conditions in (2) arise from the observations that in general
[LBn, Bn] 6= 1, [LBn, UBn] = 1.
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b) If z = e we require the following conditions
[LA, LB] = 1, [RA, RB] = 1,
[LA, RA] 6= 1, [LB, RB] 6= 1,
[LB, RA] 6= 1, [LA, RB] 6= 1.
(3)
We were unable to show that the DH-DP using conditions (2) or (3) was easy.
Hence we assume that the DH-DP is hard with condition with the above con-
ditions. Note condition (3) is condition (2) but with conditions of the form of a
subset not commuting with Z omitted (because z = e) and the additional condi-
tions [LB, RA] 6= 1, [LA, RB] 6= 1. The above additional conditions are required
so the DH-DP is not easy and hence our authentication scheme is secure.
• Phase 1. Key generation
i) Choose a public z ∈ Z.
ii) A chooses secret elements a1 ∈ LA, a2 ∈ RA, her private key; she
publishes z
′
= a1za2; the pair (z, z
′
) is the public key.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase
i) B chooses b1 ∈ LB, b2 ∈ RB and sends the challenge x = b1zb2 to A.
ii) A sends the response w = H(a1xa2) to B, and B checks w = H(b1z
′
b2).
H is a fixed collision-free hash function from elements of G to sequences of
0
′
s and 1
′
s or, possibly, to elements of G, for which this choice of H , G must
have an efficient solution for the word problem for use in phase 2ii)
Proposition 4.1
Our Authentication Scheme is a perfectly honest-verifier ZK interactive proof
of knowledge of a1 and a2.
Proof. (Sketch) Completeness. Assume that, at step 2(ii) w
′
is sent by A. Then
B accepts A’s key if and only if w
′
= H(b1z
′
b2) which is equivalent to
w
′
= H(b1(a1za2)b2). (4)
By hypothesis a1 ∈ LA, a2 ∈ RA, b1 ∈ LB, b2 ∈ RB, so b1a1 = a1b1, b2a2 =
a2b2 holds and (4) is equivalent to w = H(a1(b1zb2)a2) i.e. w
′
= w.
Soundness. Assume cheater A
′
is accepted with non-negligible probability.
This means A
′
can compute H(b1z
′
b2) with non-negligible probability. Since
H is supposed to be an ideal hash function, this means that A
′
can compute
the element q satisfying H(q) = H(b1z
′
b2) with non-negligible probability and
this is because of two possibilities. The first possibility is that q = b1z
′
b2 which
contradicts the hypothesis that the DH-DP is hard. The second possibility is
q 6= b1z
′
b2 which means that A
′
and B are able to find a collision for H which
contradicts that H is a collision free hash function.
Honest-verifier zero knowledge. Consider the probabilistic Turing machine
defined as follows: it chooses random elements b1 and b2 using the same drawing
as the honest verifier, and outputs the instances (b1, b2, H(b1z
′
b2)). So the
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instances generated by this simulator follow the same probability distribution
as the ones generated by the interactive pair (A,B). 
4.1 Comparison of Our Authentication Scheme with the
Sibert-Dehornoy-Girault Authentication Scheme
The generalisation (not the variants) specialises to the SDG scheme (hence
our authentication scheme can be as secure as the SDG authentication scheme)
with the parameters H = h, G = Bn, Z = Bn, LA = RA = LBn, LB = RB =
UBn, b1 = r, b2 = r
−1, a1 = s, a2 = s
−1, z = b, z
′
= b
′
, x = t , w = y, the first
method is used to select the subsets and conditions (2) (or property a) is true)
are used.
If z = e then this implies the following. Condition (3) do not allow the
subgroups used in the SDG scheme to be used in our authentication scheme,
because if these subgroups are used as the incorrect choices for LA, LB, RA
and RB in our authentication scheme then it is easy to see the DH-DP is easy
and hence our authentication scheme is insecure. There is more control of the
public parameters (the choices of the subsets) compared to the SDG scheme
and this may be useful for selecting secure public keys. Compared to the SDG
scheme, potentially our authentication scheme requires less memory and fewer
multiplications to compute the challenge of B and the public key of A. This
is because the identity element may take little memory (compared to b 6= e) to
represent depending on the representation of G. Alternatively we can omit the
implementation of using Z completely because x and z
′
can be computed using
two multiplications.
4.2 A Variant of the Authentication Scheme
A variant of the above authentication scheme is as follows
• Phase 0. Initial Setup. The phase 0 is the same as phase 0 of the authen-
tication scheme in section 4.
• Phase 1. Key generation
i) Choose a public z ∈ Z.
ii) A chooses (invertible) secret elements a1 ∈ LA, a2 ∈ RA, her private
key; she publishes z
′
= a1za2; the pair (z, z
′
) is the public key.
• Phase 2. Authentication phase
i) B chooses b1 ∈ LB, b2 ∈ RB and sends the challenge x = b1z
′b2 to A.
ii) A sends the response w = H(a−1
1
xa−1
2
) to B, and B checks w =
H(b1zb2), if the check is true he accepts if the check is false he rejects.
H is a fixed collision-free hash function from elements of G to sequences of
0
′
s and 1
′
s or, possibly, to elements of G, for which this choice of H , G must
have an efficient solution for the word problem for use in phase 2ii). The above
variant authentication scheme has security based on the DH-DP’.
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The above variant authentication scheme specialises to the authentication
scheme in [14]. The above variant protocol specialises to the authentication
scheme in [14] with the parameters, conditions (3) are used, G a finite non-
abelian group, Bob is user B in our protocol, Alice is user A in our protocol
z = identity element, LA, RB are publicly known and is generated by a, RB
is generated by b, LB = LA, RB = RA B selects the secret element which is
depends on the secret exponents 0 < r < n1, 0 < s < n2, a
r ∈ LA, b
s ∈ RB,
A selects the secret element which is depends on the secret exponents 0 < v <
n1, 0 < w < n2, a
v ∈ LA, b
w ∈ RB, so the common secret key is z
′
= avbw,
where the notation e, f ,is used in [14].
5. New Key Agreement Protocol
The setup for the authentication protocols in the above section can be used
for key agreement as follows.
• Phase 0. Initial Setup. The phase 0 is the same as phase 0 of the authen-
tication scheme in section 4.
• Choose z ∈ G. Phase 1.
ii) A(lice) chooses a secret elements a1 ∈ LA, a2 ∈ RA, her private key;
she publishes KA = a1za2; the pair (z,KA) is the public key.
i) B(ob) chooses a secret elements b1 ∈ LB, b2 ∈ RB, her private key; she
publishes KB = b1zb2; the pair (z,KB) is the public key.
iii) A and B can compute the common shared secret key κ as κ = a1KBa2
and κ = b1KAb2 respectively. Optionally the alternative computation
κ = h(a1KBa2) and κ = h(b1KAb2) can be done.
h is a fixed collision-free hash function from braids to sequences of 0’s and
1’s or, possibly, to braids, for which this choice for h. Again the above protocol
is considered with the commutativity conditions 2 or 3. Note the elements KA
and KB are rewritten for example a normal form to make the protocol secure.
Because phase 0 is the same as the authentication scheme again its security is
based on a variant of the DP, DH-DP and the difficulty of computing centralisers.
Our protocol specialises to the CKLHC protocol in [8] is the above protocol
with the parameters G the braid group, A and B commuting defined by LBn
and UBn are the two commuting subgroups of Bn generated by the Artin gen-
erators σ1, ..., σ⌊n/2⌋−1 and σ⌊n/2⌋, ..., σn−1, the first method in phase 0 is used
and the DH-DP uses the condition (2). The publicly transmitted information
is rewritten using the left canonical form. The KLCHKP protocol [2] is the
specialisation of the CKLHC protocol with a2 = a
−1
1
and b2 = b
−1
1
and hence
our protocol generalises the KLCHKP protocol.
Our protocol specialises to the key agreement protocol given on page two of
[4] with the parameters LA = RB, LB = RA, [LA, LB] = 1, and commutativity
condition (2), G is a semi-group or G is the Thompson group, the first method
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in phase 0 is used and hence our protocol generalise the protocol given in [4].
Using the notation used in [4] this is LA = A,LB = B, z = w. So the left and
right secrets are taken from different subgroups the protocol.
Our protocol specialises to the key agreement protocol given in [5] when
G is a group, A and B are subgroups in the parameters of the DH-DP, us-
ing the third method in phase 0 to select the subsets/ modify the key agree-
ment protocol described above, commutativity condition 2, LB ⊆ CG(a1), LB =
{α1, ..., αk}, RA ⊆ CG(b2), RA = {β1, ..., βk},KA and KB are rewritten using a
normal form, using the notation given in [5] this is KA = PA,KB = PB, B =
LB, A = RA.
Hence we get new variants (which use less multiplications) of the protocols
[4], [5], [2],[8] if we consider the parameters that our key agreement protocol
above specialises to the protocols above but using condition (3) instead of con-
ditions (2), for example if we consider the second method in phase 0 to modify
the protocol with the parameters above to specialise, then compared to using
the third method in phase 0 the advantage of this protocol is that user A does
not have to wait for B to select the subgroup and so for example can create the
certificate to prove that the public key of A belongs to A.
5.1 Variant of Key Exchange
A variant of the key exchange is as follows
The above setup can be used for key agreement as follows the details are as
follows.
• Phase 0. Initial Setup. The phase 0 is the same as phase 0 of the authen-
tication scheme in section 4.
• Choose z ∈ G.
ii) A(lice) chooses a secret invertible elements a1 ∈ LA, a2 ∈ RA, her
private key; she publishes KA = a1za2; the pair (z,KA) is the public key.
i) B(ob) chooses a secret braid b1 ∈ LB, b2 ∈ RB, his private key; he
publishes KB = b1KAb2; the pair (KA,KB) is the public key.
iii) A and B can compute the common shared secret key κ as κ =
a−1
1
KBa
−1
2
and κ = b1zb2 respectively. Optionally the alternative compu-
tation κ = h(a−1
1
KBa
−1
2
) and κ = h(b1KAb2) can be done.
h is a fixed collision-free hash function from braids to sequences of 0’s and
1’s or, possibly, to braids, for which this choice for h. Again the above protocol
is considered with the commutativity conditions 2 or 3. Note the elements KA
and KB are rewritten for example a normal form to make the protocol secure.
Again because phase 0 is the same as the authentication scheme we have
sketched its security is based on a variant of the DP, DH-DP’ and/or the diffi-
culty of computing centralisers.
The above variant protocol specialises to the key exchange in [9] with the
parameters, conditions (2) or (3) are used, G a finite non-abelian group, Bob is
user B in our protocol, Alice is user A in our protocol, z = e, LA is publicly
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known and is generated by a, RB is generated by b, LB = LA, RB = RA B
selects the secret element which is depends on the secret exponents 0 < r <
n1, 0 < s < n2, a
r ∈ LA, b
s ∈ RB, A selects the secret element which is depends
on the secret exponents 0 < v < n1, 0 < w < n2, a
v ∈ LA, b
w ∈ RB , so the
common secret key is κ = f = avbw, where the notation e, f is used in [9].
5.1.1 Groups With No Efficient Normal Form
If there is no efficient algorithm for a canonical form in G then the secret
elements such as Alice’s secret key must be disguised in another way such as
using a scrambling function. The algorithm in [1] for when G is a group, and
there is no efficient normal form in G but there is an efficient algorithm for the
word problem in G, can be used to find a common shared secret key can be
found as follows using the algorithm in [1] which is. Fix b as b = 0 or b = 1.
1. B sends a rewritten form of κ which is r for r = κ or a random word for
r, r 6= κ.
2. User A checks if k = r then this determines the bit b, otherwise the bit is
1− b.
3. The steps 1 and 2 are repeated m times so an m bit key is exchanged.
As stated in [1] the protocol is probabilistic and slower compared to using a
canonical form.
6. Security Analysis
The attacks below are considered with commutativity condition for the DH-
DP such as (2) and (3) below.
6.1 Attacks When Second Method is used to Choose Subsets
in Authentication Scheme and Key Exchange Scheme
If the second method above is used to select the subsets then following the
attack given in [5] the security of the protocol to find A or B′s private key may
be found as follows
Attack on A’s Key. Find an element a′
1
which commutes with every element
of the subgroup LB and an element a
′
2
∈ RB which commutes with every element
of the subgroup RB such that z
′ = a′
1
za′
2
where a′
1
za′
2
above may be rewritten
using a normal form. The pair (a′
1
, a′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (a1, a2), because
a′
1
za′
2
= a1za2 this means an attacker can authenticate as Alice. The attack
applies to the key exchange protocol (when the second method is used to choose
the subsets) with the modification KA = a
′
1
za′
2
instead of z′ = a′
1
za′
2
this gives
a equivalent secret key for A used to get the common secret key.
Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to do the above attack Alice’s
private key
A1. Compute the centraliser of RB, RB ⊆ CG(a2) and compute the cen-
traliser of LB, LB ⊆ CG(a1)
A2. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< CG(LB) > ·z· < CG(RB) >.
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So for the protocol to be secure we want both the above problems to be
computationally hard, for the problem A1 to be hard it is required both the
centralisers CG(LB) and CG(RB) be large enough to resist a brute force type
attack. The above attack can be used to attack the authentication scheme
or recover A’s secret elements with the modification z
′
= a′
1
za′
2
instead of
KA = a
′
1
za′
2
(z′ is used instead of KA etc.) so this can be used to impersonate
A.
Attack on B’s Key in the key exchange protocol. Find an element b′
1
∈ LB
and an element b′
2
∈ RB such that KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
where b′
1
zb′
2
above may be
rewritten using a normal form. The pair (b′
1
, b′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (b1, b2),
because b′
1
zb′
2
= b1zb2 this means an attacker can find the common secret key
when this set up is used as part of a key exchange algorithm as described below.
Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to do the above attack, Bob
private key
B1. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< LB > ·z· < RB >.
So for the protocol to be secure we want the above problem to be compu-
tationally hard, for the problem B1 to be hard it is required that the elements
cannot of LB, RB all be tested (for an equivalent key pair b
′
1
, b′
2
) so to resist
a brute force attack the possible values for b′
1
, b′
2
should be large enough. The
above attack can be used to attack the authentication scheme or recover B’s
secret elements with the modification x′ = b′
1
z′b′
2
instead of KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
(x′
is used instead of KB and z
′ is used instead of z etc.) so this can be used to
impersonate A.
6.2 Attack When Second Method is used to Choose Subsets in the
Variant Authentication Scheme and Variant Key Exchange Scheme
If the second method above is used to select the subsets then following variant
of the attack given in [5] the security of the protocol to find A or B′s private
key may be found as follows
Attack on A’s Key. Find an element a′
1
which commutes with every element
of the subgroup LB and an element a
′
2
∈ RB which commutes with every element
of the subgroup RB such that z
′ = a′
1
za′
2
where a′
1
za′
2
above may be rewritten
using a normal form and a′
1
, a′
2
are both invertible elements.
The pair (a′
1
, a′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (a1, a2), because a
′
1
za′
2
= a1za2 this
means an attacker can authenticate as Alice because the attacker can compute
a−1
1
xa−1
2
. The above attack applies to the key exchange protocol with the
modification KA = a
′
1
za′
2
instead of z′ = a′
1
za′
2
this gives an equivalent secret
key for A used to get the common secret key which can be computed as κ =
a−1
1
KBa
−1
2
. (Another attack call this attack B, is to find elements a′
1
, a′
2
such
that a′−1
1
z′a′−1
2
= z , a′
1
, a′
2
can be used instead of a1, a2 to get the common
secret key, the attack is similar for the key agreement protocol with KA used in
place of z
′
).
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Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to do the above attack Alice’s
private key
A1. Compute the centraliser of RB, RB ⊆ CG(a2) and compute the cen-
traliser of LB, LB ⊆ CG(a1)
A2. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< CG(LB) > ·z· < CG(RB) > and/or < CG(LB) > ·KB· < CG(RB) > .
(For attack B we do the search < CG(LB) > ·z
′
· < CG(RB) > there is a
variant of attack B when the third method is used to choose the subsets doing
a search of the form < LB > ·z
′
· < CG(RB) >) So for the protocol to be secure
we want both the above problems to be computationally hard, for the problem
A1 to be hard it is required both the centralisers CG(LB) and CG(RB) to be
large to resist a brute force type attack.
Attack on B’s key in the key exchange protocol. Find an element b′
1
∈ LB
and an element b′
2
∈ RB such that KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
where b′
1
zb′
2
above may be
rewritten using a normal form. The pair (b′
1
, b′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (b1, b2),
because b′
1
zb′
2
= b1zb2 this means an attacker can find the common secret key
when this set up is used as part of a key exchange algorithm as described below.
Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to do the above attack, Bob
private key
B1. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< LB > ·z· < RB > and/or < LB > ·KA· < RB >.
So for the protocol to be secure we want the above problem to be compu-
tationally hard, for the problem B1 to be hard it is required that the elements
of LB,RB cannot all be tested (for an equivalent key, pair b
′
1
, b′
2
) so to resist a
brute force attack. The above attack can be used to attack the authentication
scheme or recover B’s secret elements with the modification x = b′
1
z′b′
2
instead
of KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
(x′ is used instead of KB and z
′ is used instead of z etc.) so this
can be used to impersonate A.
6.3 Attack When Third Method is used to Choose Subsets in the
Variant Authentication Scheme and Variant Key Exchange Scheme
Attack on A’s Key. Find an element a′
1
which commutes with every element
of the subgroup LB and an element a
′
2
∈ RB such that z
′ = a′
1
za′
2
where a′
1
za′
2
above may be rewritten using a normal form and a1, a2 are both invertible
elements. The pair (a′
1
, a′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (a1, a2), because a
′
1
za′
2
=
a1za2 this means an attacker can authenticate as Alice the attack applies to the
key exchange protocol with the modification KA = a
′
1
za′
2
instead of z′ = a′
1
za′
2
is solved this gives a equivalent secret key for A used to get the common secret
key by computing κ = a′−1
1
KBa
′−1
2
.
Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to do the above attack Alice’s
private key
A1. Compute the centraliser of LA, LA ⊆ CG(a1).
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A2. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< CG(LA) > ·z· < RA > and/or < CG(LA) > ·KB· < RA > .
Attack on B’s key in the key exchange protocol is below. Find an element b′
2
which commutes with every element of the subgroup RA and an element b
′
1
∈ LB
such that KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
where b′
1
zb′
2
above may be rewritten using a normal form.
The pair (b′
1
, b′
2
) is equivalent to the pair (b1, b2), because b
′
1
zb′
2
= b1zb2 this
means an attacker can find the common secret key.
Then (following [5]) the most obvious way to recover Bob private key
B1. Compute the centraliser of RA, RA ⊆ CG(b2).
B2. Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double coset
< LB > ·z · CG(RA).
So for the protocol to be secure we want both the above problems to be
computationally hard, for the problem B2 to be hard it is required the centraliser
CG(RA) to be large enough to resist a brute force attack. The key exchange
protocol in section 5 has security based upon the above problem. The above
attack can be used to attack the authentication scheme or recover B’s secret
elements with the modification x = b′
1
z′b′
2
instead of KB = b
′
1
zb′
2
is solved (x
is used instead of KB and z
′ is used instead of z etc.) so this can be used to
impersonate Alice.
6.4 Requirements of the of Platform Group
Hence the platform group G should satisfy at least the following properties
in order for our key establishment protocol to be efficient and secure, we have
taken the requirements from [5] so the properties are the same as given in [5]
with the relevant modifications. At least one of property P7, P8, or P9 is true
depending on the choice of protocol used.
(P1) G should be a non-commutative group of at least exponential growth.
The latter means that the number of elements of length n in G is at least
exponential in n; this is needed to prevent attacks brute force type attacks on
the key space.
(P2) This property may be optional. There should be an efficiently com-
putable normal form for elements of G.
(P3) It should be computationally easy to perform group operations (multi-
plication and inversion) on normal forms.
(P4) It should be computationally easy to generate pairs (a, {a1, ..., ak}) such
that aai = aia for each i = 1, ..., k. (Clearly, in this case the subgroup generated
by a1, ..., ak centralizes a).
(P5) For a generic set {g1, ..., gk} of elements of G it should be difficult to
compute C(g1, ..., gn) = C(g1) ∩ ... ∩ C(gk).
(P6) This property may be optional. Even if H = C(g1, ..., gn) is computed,
it should be hard to find x ∈ H and y ∈ H1 (where H1 is some fixed subgroup
given by a generating set) such that xwy = w
′
, i.e., to solve the membership
search problem for a double coset.
(P7) This property may be optional. Even if H = C(g1, ..., gn) is computed,
and H1 = C(g
′
1
, ..., g′m) (g
′ is a generator as usual) is computed and it should
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be hard to find x ∈ H and y ∈ H1 such that xwy = w
′
, i.e., to solve the
membership search problem for a double coset.
(P8) This property may be optional. Given H and H1 is some fixed sub-
groups given by a generating sets,and it should be hard to find x ∈ H and
y ∈ H1 such that xwy = w
′
, i.e., to solve the membership search problem for a
double coset.
(P9)This property may be optional. Which is there should be an efficiently
algorithm for the word problem in G.
6.5 Braid groups
We now consider braid groups as a possible platform group. Here we consider
the properties (P1)-(P6) from the previous section.
(P1) For n > 2, braid groups Bn are non-commutative groups of exponential
growth.
(P2) There are several known normal forms for elements of Bn, including
Garside normal form (see [8]). The Garside normal form is efficiently com-
putable.
(P3) There are efficient algorithms to multiply or invert normal forms of
elements of Bn [8].
(P4) It is not so easy to compute the whole centralizer of an element g of
G [5]. The number of steps required to compute CG(g) is proportional the size
of the SSS (super summit set) of g. Generally speaking the “super summit
set” is not of polynomial size in n and the braid length. Nevertheless, there are
approaches to finding “large parts” of CG(g), e.g. one can generate a sufficiently
large part of SSS(g).
(P5) For a generic subgroup A there is no efficient algorithm to compute
CG(A).
(P6),(P7) and (P8) There is no known solution to the membership search
problem for double cosets HwH ′ in braid groups.
(P9) There are efficient algorithms for the word problem in braid groups,
such as the practical handle reduction algorithm for the word problem described
in [10].
7. Conclusion
We have presented new two-pass authentication schemes and key exchange
protocols. This paper is a work in progress, because further work we plan to
do for our authentication scheme is to investigate potential semigroups (apart
from braid groups) and parameters for which it is secure, when its security is
based on the DH-DP or variants of the DH-DP.
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